
By: Jon Costello
Venture Global VG 0.00%↑ is one of three large publicly-traded U.S. LNG companies. Its peers are Cheniere Energy LNG 0.00%↑ , the operator of Sabine Pass and Corpus Christi export facilities, and NextDecade NEXT 0.00%↑, a development-phase company set to begin exports in 2027 from its Rio Grande LNG facility. Among U.S. LNG exporters, only Cheniere and VG currently produce at commercial scale.
VG owns two liquefaction facilities on the Louisiana Gulf Coast: Calcasieu Pass, which declared commercial operations in April 2025, and Plaquemines, which is currently in commissioning. Plaquemines Phase 1 is expected to reach commercial operations in the fourth quarter of 2026 and Phase 2 in mid-2027. The company has a third facility, CP2, a $33 billion greenfield project that received final investment decision (FID) in July 2025, is under construction, and expected to commence LNG production in late 2027. Beyond these, VG has expansion projects at both Plaquemines and CP2, as well as a separate greenfield project, CP3, in early development.
VG’s competitive edge is its construction speed and modular cost discipline. Rather than using two or three large liquefaction trains as older U.S. projects did, VG uses dozens of smaller, factory-built mid-scale trains that can be installed sequentially. Its first facility, Calcasieu Pass (CP1), went from FID to first cargo in roughly 30 months, a timeline the company bills as the fastest FID-to-first-cargo for a greenfield U.S. LNG project.
VG also owns a fleet of seven LNG tankers with two more on order, bringing the total fleet to nine. This lets the company ship its own cargoes to wherever in the world LNG prices are highest. Most of its U.S. peers sell at the Gulf Coast dock and let the buyer profit from shipping the LNG overseas. To the extent VG’s facilities produce more LNG than their contracted nameplate capacity, the company can use its own tanker fleet to capture spot prices on those excess volumes.
CP1 is currently producing at roughly 11.2 million tons per annum (mtpa), about 12% above its 10 mtpa nameplate capacity, thanks to the same modular design that enabled fast construction. As Plaquemines completes commissioning, VG’s consolidated output will climb to approximately 40 mtpa by the time both of its phases reach commercial operations. The table below summarizes VG’s full project portfolio.
Investors should avoid VG shares at the current price. My concerns center on three areas: the company’s deteriorating margin economics, its slow-to-deleverage balance sheet, and management practices that, in my view, put minority shareholders at risk. The sections that follow walk through each in turn.
From an economics perspective, revenue tied to spot pricing will wind down as contracted SPAs replace it, compressing margins even as total LNG production volumes rise. The balance sheet is an issue because leverage peaks in 2026, and only the bull-case EBITDA scenario fully deleverages the company back toward 2025 levels by 2028. And management’s conduct toward VG’s contracted counterparties and IPO disclosure practices raises questions about how this team is likely to treat minority shareholders when their interests diverge from its own.
Background on the LNG Business
U.S. LNG exporters like VG sell their LNG through a model akin to a toll road, in which the exporter purchases natural gas on the buyer’s behalf from U.S. pipelines, converts it to LNG by cooling it to -260°F, and loads it onto tankers. The exporter earns a fixed fee per unit for this conversion service. The buyer—typically an oil and gas major or a national energy company—takes or “lifts” the LNG and decides where to send it.
The buyer’s commitment is locked in through a sale-and-purchase agreement (SPA). An SPA is a legally binding long-term contract that specifies volumes, delivery terms, and pricing. SPAs typically run 15 to 20 years and are structured as take-or-pay, so the buyer must pay whether or not it actually lifts the cargoes. This long-term, predictable revenue stream derived from these agreements allows lenders to finance the construction of a facility based on its signed SPAs.
A standard U.S. SPA pricing formula has two components, both expressed per MMBtu:
A commodity fee of roughly 115% of Henry Hub. The 15% uplift covers the 8% to 10% of the feedstock gas burned to power the liquefaction process, plus a modest margin.
A fixed liquefaction fee that represents the exporter’s margin from executing the natural gas conversion service. VG’s Calcasieu SPAs were set in 2018 and run roughly $2.25 per MMBtu. Its Plaquemines SPAs were signed during the tighter market that prevailed in 2021-2023 and are priced at $2.50 to $3.50 per MMBtu.
For example, at a Henry Hub price of $3.50 per MMBtu, a buyer on a typical VG Calcasieu SPA pays $6.28 per MMBtu all-in. Of that, $4.03 is the commodity-fee component, which VG uses to pay for the feed gas it converts into LNG. The remaining $2.25 is the fixed liquefaction fee, which represents VG’s actual gross margin earned from providing the service.
This tolling structure has been the dominant model for every greenfield U.S. LNG contract signed since 2016. In these transactions, the LNG exporter earns a near-utility-like spread, and the buyer assumes the commodity price risk.
Once a plant begins producing LNG, its SPAs don’t start generating contracted revenue until the facility reaches its Commercial Operations Date (COD), the date on which the facility is officially declared ready for full commercial service. Before COD, a plant that has started producing LNG sells its cargoes on the short-term spot market under what’s called “commissioning cargo” sales, at whatever prevailing prices the market is paying at the time.
Deteriorating Margin Outlook
The first reason to avoid VG is based on the company’s economics. The main concern is that its liquefaction margins are set to decline over the coming years.
VG was able to capture extremely high margins during the 2022-2025 period because its operating facilities were selling commissioning cargoes at prevailing spot prices rather than delivering under the pricing in their existing SPAs, which became effective after the COD.
Those contracted SPAs had been signed with major counterparties years earlier but had not been activated because VG had not yet declared commercial operations at Calcasieu Pass. As each facility reaches COD and transitions to fixed liquefaction fees, VG’s margins will decline. Its 2022-2025 experience was essentially a one-time windfall that is set to unwind as the transition to facilities operating on SPAs proceeds.
Consider that VG’s consolidated weighted-average fixed liquefaction fee has trended downward on a quarterly basis. The step-down from the first quarter of 2025 to the second quarter was driven by Calcasieu Pass declaring COD on April 15, 2025, which activated its SPAs and replaced its higher commissioning-cargo pricing.
The same downward trend is evident on an annual basis.
Management’s project-completion cadence points to further margin compression as each facility transitions from commissioning economics to post-COD contracted pricing.
VG’s margin contraction will drive its EBITDA lower in the coming year. In 2025, the company generated Consolidated Adjusted EBITDA of $6.3 billion. Its 2026 guidance range is $5.2 to $5.8 billion, with a midpoint of $5.5 billion, representing an approximately 12% year-over-year decline despite projected cargo volume growth.
The apparent disconnect between volume growth and EBITDA contraction is attributable to a shift in what counts as EBITDA. Commissioning cargo proceeds aren’t recorded as EBITDA. Rather, accounting rules require them to be applied as a reduction to the project’s construction cost on the balance sheet. So more commissioning cargoes in 2026 will bring in real cash, but none of that cash shows up in reported EBITDA. Meanwhile, the post-COD volumes that do appear in EBITDA pay substantially lower fixed liquefaction fees than the spot-priced commissioning cargoes they replace.
VG is currently producing slightly below 30 mtpa and is expected to ramp to slightly more than 30 mtpa by the end of 2026. From an analysis perspective, these are the company’s lowest-risk volumes, as the projects producing them are either operating (CP1) or in active commissioning (Plaquemines Phases 1 and 2).
Volumes and margins above VG’s initial 30 mtpa are more difficult to model because Plaquemines Phase 1 transitions from commissioning-cargo pricing into its fixed long-term SPAs at its COD, expected in the fourth quarter of 2026. Plaquemines Phase 2 continues its existing commissioning phase through its mid-2027 COD, and CP2 Phase 1 begins producing spot-priced commissioning cargoes in late 2027.
In addition to the initial 30 mtpa, VG has approximately 20 mtpa of CP2 Phase 1 committed and funded, as the company secured $15.1 billion in project financing for Phase 1 in July 2025. CP2 Phase 2, representing approximately 9 mtpa of expected capacity, is targeting a mid-2026 final investment decision and is not yet funded. Beyond that, more than 70 mtpa of additional capacity is expected at CP3 and the Plaquemines Expansion, which are expected to reach COD after 2030. Given the uncertainties regarding that last growth phase, I consider it as option value in my analysis.
VG’s Bull Case Depends on a Lot Going Right
As VG’s margins decline further in 2027, its EBITDA will face pressure. As pricing transitions from spot capture to SPAs, I expect the weighted-average liquefaction margin run rate to decline toward $3.50 per MMBtu. On VG’s 30 mtpa of highly certain capacity, this implies approximately $4 billion of EBITDA from that base.
Incremental margins will receive a boost from Plaquemines Phase 2’s commissioning-cargo phase, which has been underway since 2025 and continues through its mid-2027 COD, a roughly two-year window of spot-priced volumes that is already partially complete. CP2 Phase 1 begins its own commissioning window with first LNG targeted for late 2027, according to management.
By 2028, Phase 1 should be ramping up commissioning cargoes at spot prices, with its own post-COD SPAs not activated until its expected late-2029 COD. Total operating capacity in 2028 would reach approximately 44 mtpa of nameplate capacity across Calcasieu, both Plaquemines phases, and CP2 Phase 1 ramping. VG’s production split between contracted SPAs and spot volumes derived from excess capacity sold through VG Commodities, plus CP2 Phase 1 commissioning cargoes, would be approximately 63%/37%.
The table below shows my EBITDA estimates for VG under different margin and volume scenarios.
These figures assume that LNG spot prices remain steady with 2025 levels.
In 2028, CP1 is likely to be producing above nameplate capacity. The table below illustrates its production potential. I assume CP1 produces at its Expected Annualized Production Capacity of 11.2 mtpa, roughly 12% above its 10.0 mtpa nameplate.
Assuming further that both Plaquemines phases produce at peak capacity and CP2 Phase 1 has begun ramping commissioning-cargo production, 2028 could see VG produce total output of approximately 52 mtpa at peak capacity. Given roughly 37% spot capture, its weighted-average margin could temporarily rise toward $5.00 per MMBtu, though this wouldn’t be sustainable over the long term, as production transitions to SPAs. In such a scenario, VG could generate approximately $9 billion of EBITDA.
Achieving that $9 billion outcome at VG’s current valuation requires six specific things to go right.
1. Weighted-average liquefaction fees have to hold around 2026 guided levels. With an LNG glut becoming less likely near-term, this is plausible but far from certain.
2. Plaquemines Phase 1 has to reach a clean fourth-quarter 2026 COD and contribute a full year of contracted output in 2028.
3. Plaquemines Phase 2 has to reach a mid-2027 COD on schedule and ramp to a fourth-quarter 2028 run rate near full capacity.
4. CP2 Phase 1 has to deliver its first commissioning cargoes in late 2027 and scale meaningfully through 2028.
5. CP1 would have to run all year at its 11.2 mtpa Expected Annualized Production Capacity. Of the 11.2 mtpa total, 10.0 mtpa (100% of nameplate) is directly contracted to third parties under 20-year and medium-term SPAs. The remaining 1.2 mtpa of excess capacity is sold through VG Commodities, with roughly half of those volumes committed to a separate 20-year SPA at international gas-price indices and the balance sold opportunistically at spot prices.
6. Plaquemines Phase 1 would also have to run all year at nameplate capacity in 2028. All of its 13.3 mtpa of production would be contracted to third parties.
My 2028 EBITDA Estimate Is Lower
These six outcomes combine to produce the $9 billion 2028 EBITDA bull case.
Probability-weighting each outcome, my own 2028 EBITDA estimate is $7 to $8 billion. My assumptions are as follows.
The table below captures the production capacity for each of VG’s LNG liquefaction facilities. It shows what has to go right for the bull case to be realized.
Per management’s guidance, Plaquemines Phase 2 reaches COD in mid-2027 and ramps through 2028. Its best-case contribution for 2028 at full capacity would be 6.7 mtpa, all contracted with third parties. In reality, however, first-year post-COD ramp-up execution risk would likely put 2028 Phase 2 production closer to 5–6 mtpa. The bull case assumes the full 6.7 mtpa.
In 2028, Plaquemines excess capacity could provide up to 8.0 mtpa of spot-capture output above nameplate, once both phases are ramped, and FERC and DOE approvals for above-nameplate production are finalized. This is pure spot exposure and would be the company’s largest single discretionary spot-capture component in 2028. The bull case assumes significant excess capacity here.
CP2 Phase 1, following first LNG targeted for late 2027, is expected to ramp up commissioning cargoes through 2028 as liquefaction trains come online, potentially representing several mtpa of spot-priced output across the year. Importantly, the cash from these commissioning cargoes does not flow through as EBITDA. VG instead applies it as an offset against the cost of building the plant, thereby reducing the amount of capital the company has to raise to finish construction, but adding nothing to reported earnings. CP2 Phase 2 remains pre-FID and is unlikely to contribute first-LNG volumes in 2028, absent an aggressive early-FID outcome.
Then there is the risk of lower LNG prices. If additional supply from Qatar, Golden Pass, and other new facilities floods the market with LNG, lower weighted-average liquefaction fees stand to reduce VG’s 2028 EBITDA by $500 million to $1 billion. Roughly 63% of VG’s 2028 production is sold under contracted post-COD SPAs at fixed liquefaction fees, while the remaining 37% is exposed to spot pricing through VG Commodities’ excess-capacity sales and CP2 Phase 1 commissioning cargoes. It is this spot-exposed portion that faces direct margin compression from an LNG oversupply. VG’s need for higher spot prices to generate bullish financial performance over the coming years makes its shares more of a bet on higher LNG prices than some of its proponents may suspect.
If Plaquemines Phase 2 fails to reach its COD on schedule, for example, if startup slips a quarter or two, it could take $500 million to $1 billion off my 2028 EBITDA estimate.
Taken together, the probability-weightings of these outcomes drive my 2028 EBITDA expectation to the $7 to $8 billion range. At the current $12 price and approximately 2.4 billion diluted shares outstanding, VG trades at an enterprise value of approximately $60 billion of, roughly 8x my 2028 EBITDA expectation.
Deleveraging is Likely to be Slow
This valuation implied by the EBITDA I expect in 2028 isn’t excessive, but there are more risks in the picture that reduce its attractiveness.
Consider that for full-year 2026, VG is guiding to $12 to $13 billion in capex against $5.2 to $5.8 billion in EBITDA. This results in a roughly $7 billion free cash flow gap before a dollar of debt service. Analyst projections show comparable cash outflows in 2027 as Phase 2 construction continues and CP2 capex ramps. Through Phase 2 development, VG is consuming billions in cash. Since the company is not self-funding, it will draw continuously on committed borrowing facilities and capital markets.
As CP2’s trains come online through 2027 and 2028, cash from commissioning cargoes becomes a considerable offset to the project’s $33 billion total cost. The potentially billions of dollars of cash generated from commissioning cargoes will reduce the capex draws and new debt issuance VG would otherwise need to fund construction, even though none of it is booked as EBITDA. That helps the company’s reported leverage ratios on the debt side by requiring less new borrowing, but it doesn’t facilitate deleveraging through EBITDA growth.
At year-end 2025, net debt rose by approximately $7 billion year-over-year to $32.9 billion. VG’s maturity schedule shows a $5.5 billion wall in 2028 and a $6.5 billion wall in 2029. Those refinancing requirements arrive as Phase 2 ramps, during a period when VG’s spot-market pricing and Phase 2 contract pricing will be tested. Meanwhile, its net-debt-to-EBITDA ratio approaches 6x at the midpoint of 2026 guidance.
With such a high leverage ratio and little margin of safety on the balance sheet, refinancing may become more challenging if several of the variables mentioned above turn against the company, potentially introducing additional risk to the 2028 outlook and the company’s ability to refinance at attractive terms.
At year-end 2025, VG’s leverage ratio stood at 5.2x, with $32.9 billion in net debt and $6.3 billion in EBITDA. The ratio will likely get worse before it gets better, as 2026 is set to be the company’s peak leverage year, while EBITDA is expected to decline year over year. Net debt will increase to approximately $40 billion, putting the leverage ratio near 7.3x. VG won’t be at imminent risk of breaching its debt covenants, as its Revolving Credit Facility’s total-leverage test is measured at the intermediate holding company level, below the publicly listed parent, where lower debt keeps VG within its covenant limits. Still, consolidated leverage above 7x is where ratings agencies become more concerned and where refinancing on attractive terms can become more difficult.
In 2027, the situation improves modestly as Plaquemines Phase 2 reaches mid-year COD and capex tapers to $8 to $10 billion. With EBITDA growing to roughly $7 billion on Phase 2’s half-year contribution, net debt rises to approximately $43 billion, and the ratio declines to 6.1x.
In 2028, my base scenario puts VG’s leverage ratio at 5.9x, with net debt in the mid-$40 billion range, against my probability-weighted EBITDA of $7.5 billion. While this marks a significant improvement from the 7.3x 2026 peak, it remains approximately 0.7 turns above VG’s 5.2x year-end 2025 result. So even in this base case, VG does not deleverage back to the year-end 2025 level. A full return to 2025-level leverage requires either upside EBITDA or net debt that is meaningfully lower than what is considered in my base scenario.
The $9 billion 2028 EBITDA cited in the bull case is the only scenario in which VG exits 2028 at below its 5.2x year-end 2025 result, at 4.9x. Every other scenario ends in 2028 at or above the 5.9x base-case level.
Clearly, VG is not a clean deleveraging story. It is a sustained-high-leverage story characterized by considerable commercial and operational execution risk. Consequently, the company’s balance sheet and operational performance over the coming years have little margin for error. Nevertheless, the equity is pricing in deleveraging that the debt math does not support at my expected EBITDA levels. At $12 per share, VG’s stock offers no meaningful margin of safety for the risks embedded in the bull case.
Furthermore, two events could make it materially worse. A settlement of the BP Gas Marketing arbitration in the $4 billion range that hits in 2027 would add roughly 0.6 turns of leverage at the very time the ratio should be improving, keeping 2027 and 2028 leverage in the mid-to-upper 6x range. And if the company faces adverse LNG market conditions—for example, a spot-price collapse or Plaquemines Phase 2 slipping by several quarters—2028 EBITDA could fall toward $6 billion, which on the same debt base produces a 7.3x exit ratio, higher than the 2026 peak.
Questionable Counterparty Practices
Beyond the financial concerns, VG’s commercial behavior toward its contracted customers raises a separate issue that, in my view, matters at least as much as any balance-sheet concerns.
Even though CP1 started producing LNG at commercial scale in March 2022, the company took 37 months to declare its COD on April 15, 2025. During those 37 months, VG sold CP1’s cargoes on the spot market rather than delivering them under its contracted SPAs with BP (BP), Shell (SHEL), Edison, Repsol (REPYY), Galp (GLPEY), and Orlen.
This mattered commercially because spot prices during those 37 months were significantly higher than they had been when VG signed its original BP SPA in 2018. Through December 2024, VG’s sales from CP1 generated cumulative operating profit of multiple billions.
In response, all six contracted counterparties filed for arbitration. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) tribunal, the arbitration body designated in the SPAs, ruled that VG had breached its obligation to act as a “Reasonable and Prudent Operator,” a contract clause that requires the operator to run the facility the way a competent, good-faith industry peer would. The tribunal issued a “partial final award” in BP’s favor, ruling on part of the dispute while damages remain to be determined. The hearing that will set those damages is anticipated in 2026 or 2027.
BP filed its claim against VG in 2023, after VG began selling CP1 cargoes into the spot market without declaring commercial operations. The tribunal was constituted in 2023, hearings ran through 2024 and 2025, and the breach ruling came down in October 2025. The total time span from claim to final award will be roughly four years.
BP is not alone in pursuing a claim, but outcomes have been split. VG prevailed against Shell in August 2025 and Repsol, in which the tribunal found that VG acted as a Reasonable and Prudent Operator. VG lost against BP, Edison settled, and Galp and Orlen remain active. The BP ruling will inform the remaining tribunals.
The dispute is no longer about a single customer. Galp’s and Orlen’s claims remain active and will be judged against the BP template. The commissioning strategy that looked clever in 2022 has become a potentially severe commercial risk in 2026.
Other Egregious Behavior
The profits VG earned by delaying COD at CP1 came at a cost to its reputation as a reliable counterparty. In February 2025, TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanne told Reuters on the record that his company had rejected Venture Global’s offers to enter long-term LNG supply contracts because he did not trust the company, stating, “I don’t want to deal with these guys, because of what they are doing.”
This behavior is particularly striking given the BP’s central role in enabling VG to secure financing for its initial CP1 project. Project finance debt for an LNG export facility is not underwritten on the basis of assumptions about spot-market prices. Rather, it is underwritten on the discounted cash flows of long-dated, take-or-pay SPAs with counterparties creditworthy enough to support 20-year debt service. If BP, Shell, and the other investment-grade buyers had not signed those agreements, VG would have had no revenue stream against which to secure financing and no access to approximately $5.8 billion in non-recourse debt that VG raised in 2019 and used to fund the construction of Calcasieu Pass.
Which makes VG’s subsequent conduct particularly troubling. After using BP’s creditworthiness to secure the debt that built CP1, VG then ran the facility in “commissioning” status for 37 months and sold cargoes on the spot market. However, those cargoes rightfully belonged to BP under the SPA, according to the ICC tribunal’s ruling. VG generated billions in operating profit through December 2024 that, on a good-faith reading of the SPAs, should have accrued to the counterparties whose contracts enabled the financing. These dealings raise questions about management’s trustworthiness. I have no interest in being a shareholder alongside a management team that operates this way.
The same management team that directed CP1 cargoes away from BP after BP de-risked the project is still running VG. It is still signing new SPAs, and it will likely be running the company when its own interests diverge from those of VG’s shareholders. In such a scenario, I wouldn’t be surprised if minority shareholders come out on the losing end.
Sub-Par IPO Disclosures
There are other troubling signs regarding VG’s management. Its IPO disclosures, in particular, raise questions about how it communicates with shareholders. I don’t begrudge a company for aggressively marketing its securities to presumably well-informed buyers. However, VG’s behavior is more of an issue in light of its other questionable conduct.
VG priced its IPO at $25 per share on January 24, 2025, with first trading on Monday, January 27. At IPO, the company’s enterprise value was approximately $86 billion, based on 2.4 billion fully-diluted shares, a $60 billion market capitalization, and approximately $26 billion of net debt. Against $9 billion of management-guided 2028 EBITDA (its bull case), the IPO price implied an EV/EBITDA multiple of 9.6x on a four-year-forward estimate that assumes a long list of things go the company’s way. VG is now guiding for 2026 EBITDA of $5.5 billion. The IPO price represented an EV/EBITDA of 15.6x. Against my own probability-weighted 2028 EBITDA of $7 to $8 billion, the IPO valued VG at 11.5x. Given the risks to shareholders, this is a very high valuation.
Management had more than enough data at IPO to publish a pro forma 2026 EBITDA estimate. It had 2024 results in hand, the majority of 2026 volumes already contracted through SPAs, internal planning assumptions for Plaquemines Phase 1 timing, and the other inputs necessary to build a 2026 EBITDA range that would have been substantially more informative to prospective shareholders than the “$107 billion of lifetime gross contracted revenue” it used as a projection in its S-1 prospectus.
VG timed its IPO so that its historical high-margin period burnished its financials. The S-1 did not prominently highlight the coming decline in margins. The closest it came was a single statement that “long-term SPAs for future projects… are predominantly lower priced than short- and medium-term SPAs,” and even that statement was buried in a bullet about capital strategy for CP2, CP3, and the since-withdrawn Delta project.
VG’s underwriters did not price the $25-per-share IPO against annual EBITDA or cash flow projections. No doubt it had a good handle on 2025 cash flow, earnings, and EBITDA. Instead, it disclosed $107 billion of “expected total contracted revenue” spread across 39.25 mtpa of signed SPAs. By framing the opportunity this way, the company was able to avoid probing questions from prospective shareholders about its cash flow and EBITDA outlook, which was a risk to a successful offering in light of the declines ahead.
And for investors looking to become long-term owners of the stock, the lack of detailed disclosures prevented a thorough analysis. The range of 2028 EBITDA estimates of roughly $6 billion to $9 billion seen in this article exists because an analyst can work backward from contract pricing, Plaquemines ramp assumptions, spot-capture assumptions, and operating-cost assumptions. VG never published any of those assumptions in its formal disclosures.
The math points to significant overvaluation at the IPO, with no margin of safety. Management’s 39.25 mtpa of 20-year SPAs at $107 billion of lifetime revenue, divided by 20 years, works out to $5.35 billion per year of contracted revenue. That is revenue, not EBITDA, and it excludes commissioning-cargo spot capture and any volumes beyond the 39.25 mtpa. Even assuming VG earns the roughly 70% contracted EBITDA margin that Cheniere achieves under its long-term SPAs, $5.35 billion in revenue translates to approximately $3.75 billion in annual contracted EBITDA. This is the EBITDA floor that VG’s own disclosures support. Everything between $3.75 billion and $9 billion is earned through ramp, spot capture, and Plaquemines Phase 2 contract pricing that has not yet been disclosed.
At the IPO price, investors paid 22.9x the annual EBITDA supported by SPAs. Growth and other assumptions would have to account for the difference between this $3.75 billion in annual EBITDA and an investor’s higher estimate. There was no margin of safety if material EBITDA growth failed to materialize.
Adding corporate governance insult to injury for VG shareholders, the company’s equity structure is engineered to concentrate control with its founders and to lock public investors out of any meaningful say in how the company is run. At the January 2025 IPO, VG created two classes of common stock, its Class A shares, which trade publicly and carry one vote per share, and its Class B shares, which carry ten votes per share and are held entirely by Venture Global Partners II, LLC, an entity controlled by co-founders Robert Pender and Michael Sabel. VG Partners II holds 100% of the Class B shares and approximately 97.8% of the total combined voting power of the company’s outstanding common stock following the IPO. The dual-class structure has no time-based sunset, no ownership-threshold sunset, and no founder-death provision.
This equity structure lets the governance concerns raised in this article continue unchallenged, as there is no vote a public shareholder can cast that will change any of it.
Conclusion
Investors should avoid VG. The bull case of 40 mtpa in contracted nameplate capacity coming online and a construction model that is best-in-class is real, but falls down after financial and governance risks are considered.
Adjusted EBITDA falls in 2026 even as volumes climb significantly because commissioning-cargo revenue at spot prices gives way to lower margins from SPAs at economics the market has not yet priced into the stock. VG’s leverage ratio is set to climb to levels that significantly increase risk for shareholders, with only a bull scenario capable of facilitating deleveraging to 2025 levels by 2028. Behind those numbers is a management team that has already demonstrated how it treats the SPA counterparties who initially financed its corporate livelihood, while its IPO disclosures seem to obfuscate the leverage that public shareholders were underwriting.
At today’s share price, VG does not pay investors enough to take on the balance sheet, the margin outlook, and the governance record I have laid out. And since I would rather own the business whose management I trust, VG shares become an easy pass.
Analyst’s Disclosure: Jon Costello has a beneficial long position in the shares of LNG either through stock ownership, options, or other derivatives.











